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The European Horsemeat Scandal of 2013 highlighted the increasing organization and 
sophistication of the contemporary food criminal. This study aims to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of the typology of the food criminal in terms of their modus operandi and how 
individuals and organized crime groups develop criminal business models and networks in the 
context of meat supply. This research initiates a synthesized literature review across the seemingly 
disparate academic disciplines of food and agricultural policy, business theory and criminology 
in order to characterize the modes of operation at work in such networks. A conceptual framework 
is developed that considers the actors and drivers involved in criminal activity using the meat 








The European Horsemeat (or Horsegate) Scandal of 2013 has brought the issue of food fraud to 
the fore and has highlighted the ‘dark side’ of the meat trade.  The scandal evidenced a widespread 
contempt for consumers and their ability to make informed choices especially with regard to the 
species of animal they consumed. To the active food fraudster in the meat supply chain, animals 
are trafficked as a source of protein in exchanged for financial gain.  The animal’s slaughter, 
processing and eventual consumption in homes and restaurants are all necessary stages in an 
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extended illicit food supply chain.  Yet, our understanding of the modus operandi and modus 
vivendi of the food fraudster in the meat and processed food supply chain from an organizational 
and motivational perspective is minimal.  Consequentially, there is little critical academic study 
of the relationship between supply chain organization and food criminals. Therefore in this paper, 
we make an attempt to bridge the gap by describing, explaining and theorizing the challenge of 
mitigating the activities of those individuals, and the associated criminal and commercial 
organizations. 
        In this type of food fraud the animals are commoditized, often being stolen or illegally 
slaughtered through organized activities, including the poaching of game animals, prior to 
entering the supply chain, (Budiansky 1999, FSA, nd).  In the exploitation of animals for pure 
profit we consider the issue of business ethics (Desmond 2010; Jones et al. 2005) as otherwise 
inappropriate protein sources, enters into the supply chain and might be fraudulently used to 
substitute for more expensive animal protein (Ballin 2010; Williams 2008). In addition to 
fraudulent practice, this, in the instance of pig protein, also renders the meat product haram (not 
permitted and unlawful) in terms of the halal meat supply chain (Nakyinsige et al. 2012). In 
connection with the United Kingdom (UK) Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak of 2001, 
suspicions that meat had been illegally imported, illegal movements of sheep, to the spreading of 
disease with criminal intent, criminal compensation claims, and so on, underpinned the metaphor 
and the reality of criminality which were intertwined at almost every turn in the FMD narrative 
(Nerlich et al. 2004: 104; NAO 2002).   
2. The concept of food fraud and wider food crime 
Fraud involving food is an ancient practice particularly whenever there is the lure of an easy 
profit. There are always people ready and willing to exploit others (Gallagher and Thomas 2010; 
Shears 2010).  We are concerned here with the deliberate contamination of food for malicious 
intent or criminal gain (Manning et al. 2005).  Economically motivated adulteration (EMA) has 
been described as “The fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a product 
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for the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost of its 
production, i.e. for economic gain” (See Spink and Moyer 2013: 3).  Collectively, food fraud 
encompasses the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation 
of food, food ingredients, or food packaging; or false or misleading statements made about a 
product for economic gain (Spink and Moyer 2011a; 2011b; Grundy et al. 2012). Intentional food 
crime also encompasses food defense consisting of the set of actions taken in response to the 
intentional acts designed to cause harm. Food industry malpractices such as fraud are often driven 
by the need to compete with other businesses that perhaps have better economies of scale and to 
compete with corporate manufacturers, food service companies and food retailers who 
increasingly operate as oligopolies. The profits from food supply chain fraud have been described 
as being comparable to cocaine trafficking, with fewer risks (Mueller 2007).  As an example the 
‘Eurovet scandal’ in which a businessman/ farmer set up a company to import and sell unlicensed 
veterinary medicines earned the perpetrators between £6 and 13.5 million pounds (Smith and 
Whiting 2013). The fraudster supplied medicines that enhanced growth but which were not always 
legal in the country sold.     
The question arises as to whether food fraud and wider food crime can be modeled as being 
enacted by lone individuals within a business setting, or whether such food crime is driven by a 
conspiracy of practice across a wider food supply chain or through organized criminal networks.  
A typology of food criminals must encompass both examples, as one model does not fit all thus 
the categorization of food crime and food criminals is further developed in this paper.  Historic 
examples of food crime in the UK such as Operation Aberdeen and Operation Fox follow the 
conspiracy of practice model. Operation Fox involved passing condemned poultry back into the 
human food chain. As up to 1000 tonnes of rotten meat that should have been used for pet-food 
was redirected into the human food chain, the ten businessmen involved over eighteen premises 
were charged with conspiracy to defraud.  Operation Aberdeen involved similar crimes of 
redirecting of waste meat.  Six of the ten defendants were convicted and jailed for six years.  In 
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both the Operation Aberdeen and Operation Fox scenarios, although the numerous businessmen 
involved and convicted were not members of an organized crime group in the traditional sense, 
they were, nevertheless known to the police and the authorities for previous crimes of dishonesty 
or infractions of business legislation (Manning and Smith 2015).  In both examples, the criminals 
operated from within recognized business structures as opposed to organized criminal structures.  
The crimes involved group led and conspiracy driven models committed by industry insiders.  
This facet of the crimes appears to have been overlooked at the time (See section 4 below). The 
crimes happened because unscrupulous food fraudsters saw and exploited an opportunity to make 
money from waste products because at the time there was little industry supervision or scrutiny.  
In all likelihood, the authorities lacked a pre-existing mental model (such as the one developed 
later in this paper) to help them appreciate that there was industry wide scope for such criminal 
practices.  Nevertheless, Operations Aberdeen and Fox led to the setting up in the UK of the Food 
Fraud Data Base in 2006; The National Food Standards Agency (FSA) Task Force in 2007; and 
The Food Fraud Advisory Unit (FFAU) in 2009 and thus triggered the organization of UK 
authorities against food crime.   
Food crime operates at many levels and can be a global, national or a localised issue.  It spans 
the contexts of both urban and rural crime and criminality.  Food crime can be committed in both 
short and long supply chains.  The horsemeat scandal demonstrates the intricate nature and the 
complexity of long food supply chains.  In that instance, the chain involved a food processor in 
France, its subsidiary in Luxembourg, a subcontractor in Cyprus, a meat trader in the Netherlands, 
abattoirs in Romania, and a number of food businesses in the UK, Ireland and across Europe 
selling the end products (NAO 2013).  The report determines that since 2003 there have been a 
number of policy and market factors that might have increased the likelihood of food fraud, for 
example: 
 Food fraud is harder to trace because of the increased complexity of the food supply chain; 
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 The European Union (EU) has expanded, increasing the entry points for food from the rest 
of the world and there is the potential for variability in the effectiveness of controls; 
 There are additional pressures on suppliers to cut supply chain costs, in the light of 
pressure on household budgets; and, 
 Pressure on food availability worldwide has increased the cost of many ingredients and 
foods. 
The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS 2014) in their briefing document “Fighting 
Fraud” highlight the reasons they believe led to the horsemeat incident namely the 2008 financial 
crisis and rising food prices driving a demand for cheap food, and more specifically cheap protein, 
the complexity of food supply chains, pressure on control services, the low risk of detection, the 
lack of focus on detecting food fraud and lastly the lack of a strong deterrent (penalties).  
Simultaneously, the 2008 financial crisis caused a number of additional horses to face slaughter 
because their owners could no longer pay for their keep, and the legal trade in horses was affected 
by this “over-supply”. The scandal also demonstrates some of the challenges of maintaining 
product integrity and minimizing food crime if a food commodity changes hands frequently, on 
paper even if not in practice, over a range of national boundaries. There is also a local model of 
such substitution in a regional area, where again the “product” passes through several regulatory 
boundaries e.g. in the UK, at county level, it can change its identity e.g. horsemeat from the 
slaughter house can reappear as meat labeled as beef further down the supply chain. Manning and 
Smith (2015) identify that local and niche focused foods are at as much risk of food fraud as global 
chains where there is opportunity for individuals to substitute, falsify or mislabel.    
A more sophisticated understanding of the organizational and operating practices of the food 
criminal in terms of their modus operandi and how individuals and groups develop criminal 
business models and networks will enable politicians, policy makers, investigators and academics 
to better understand the criminal individuals and the enterprises involved in food crime of which 
a part is food fraud.  Therefore, the aim of this research is to: 
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 Provide a synthesized literature review across seemingly disparate academic disciplines 
of food and agricultural policy, business theory and criminology; and 
 Consider the modes of operation at work and develop a conceptual framework that 
considers the organizational dynamics, actors and drivers that interweave in criminal 
activity associated with animals and the meat trade with a view to enabling their 
mitigation.  
3. Categorizing food crime from an organizational perspective 
There is an increasingly blurred line between illegitimate commercial activities [criminologically 
associated with corporate or white-collar crime] and illegitimate economies and economic 
transitions [criminologically related to organized and professional crime] (See Croall 2009a: 166). 
Croall (2009b) categorized food crime as food poisoning, food adulteration and food fraud, 
misleading indications i.e. false claims such as low fat, misleading descriptions e.g. the use of the 
words “natural”, “traditional”, “pure”, misleading pictures i.e. depictions on packaging that do 
not reflect the nature of the product inside, and the use of overlarge packaging suggesting that the 
food item inside is larger than the reality.  Moreover, Spink and Moyer (2013) identified seven 
types of food fraud (as a sub-category of food crime) as previously described.  We synthesize the 
literature sources to form a categorization of food crime (Table 1) building on the work of Croall 
(2009b).  
Table 1 introduces the types of food fraud to be considered.  Each type of food crime generates 
different potential levels of fiscal gains and the degree of gain is dependent on how well the 
‘crime’ has been executed and if detection of the crime eventually occurs.  Therefore food crime 
is undertaken by individuals and/ or groups with varying criminal and business modus operandi.  
Food criminals are clandestine, stealthy, and actively seek to avoid detection (Spink 2011).  Spink 
et al. (2013) build on this theme and define criminal types and their attributes (See Table 2).  
Tables 1 and 2 should be consulted in conjunction with each other.   
Take in Tables 1 and 2 
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The varying motives and areas of activity associated with each criminal type means that diverse 
organizational and supply chain strategies are required to mitigate their actions by so-called 
“countermeasures”. Valid countermeasures can include: the use of unique serial numbers at batch, 
product or lot level; traceability through measures such as Radio Frequency Identification Devices 
(RFID); and features on the packaging of individual items such as special inks, holograms, etc. 
on cases of product or on each pallet (Spink et al. 2010). Spink and Moyer (2011c) combine their 
work outlined in Tables 1 and 2 to develop a risk assessment matrix that can then drive the 
development of such countermeasures. Table 3 in this paper synthesizes the literature described 
in Tables 1 and 2.   
Take in Table 3 
 
Everstine et al. (2013) determine that EMA incidents reveal voids in quality assurance testing 
methodologies that are exploitable for intentional harm and/or economic gain.  Indeed any gaps 
in traceability, quality assurance programs or interfaces between different certification schemes 
will be exploited where they occur by individuals for economic benefit. With specific emphasis 
on the meat supply chain, this could occur at the interface between farm and processing 
certification systems or the interaction between government and private business inspections such 
as in meat plants. Third party certification has been developed as a food industry reaction to the 
need for assurance of safe and legal food at all stages of the supply chain at farm, manufacturing 
and processing and at distribution level.  However in the aftermath of the 2013 horsemeat scandal, 
a gap was identified at agent, or broker, level i.e. those organizations and individuals that only 
retain ownership of a food or food commodity at a “paper” level. They oversee the passage of 
food materials through the, often legitimate, physical supply chain by their actions at the 
commercial and organizational level.  The British Retail Consortium (BRC) as a result of the 2013 
scandal developed the BRC Global Standard for Agents and Brokers (BRC 2014) to augment their 
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existing BRC Global Standards in an effort to mitigate the associated risk. Again there is a 
challenge as the certification audits are discrete and each with their own specific scope rather than 
an augmented, interactive process. Manning and Soon (2014) argue that it is important to consider 
whether third party certification of organizations against management system standards either 
guarantee increased compliance with statutory food standards product requirements or that such 
certification activities will address covert criminal behavior which by its nature involves the 
falsification of product, labeling and/or documentation at one point or several points in the supply 
chain. Indeed, criminal activity, is unlikely to occur during a timetabled third party certification 
audit promoting stealth as discovery of such practices would prohibit further financial gain 
(Manning and Soon 2014).    
 With specific emphasis on the meat supply chain, mechanisms can be developed to assess 
the likelihood of such crime and the potential for critical points where individuals have the 
opportunity to use/substitute/include different ingredients and materials (i.e. 
agricultural/veterinary inputs / processing stage) and use alternative packaging/labeling (i.e. at the 
packing or distribution stage). The complex nature of the interaction of predictive and reactive 
systems to mitigate food adulteration has been considered (See Manning and Soon 2014).  Spink 
and Moyer (2013) argue that after a period of incorporating food fraud methodologies into risk 
assessment models, certification standards, supply chain assurance, and product verification, it 
may be equally difficult to remember a national or organizational food standards control program 
without there being a food fraud preventive system in place as it would be now a food safety 
system without the use of hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) plans.  However, using 
technical risk assessment approaches alone is flawed because by its nature crime is entrepreneurial 
and criminal activities evolve alongside changes in food law, testing regimes, supply chain 
specifications and standards. Considering food crime as simply a transactional process will limit 
the value of the risk categorization approach. Food crime involves a number of transformational 
elements that semi-quantitative risk assessment will not accommodate and a formal approach 
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must consider and mitigate these as well.  Risk rating matrices and other forms of semi-
quantitative risk ranking system are developed based on historic or existing knowledge and if used 
must continually evolve as knew knowledge becomes available thus being transactional. The 
horsemeat scandal demonstrates that emerging knowledge and behavior extends far beyond the 
recognized visible culture of the food supply chain. A transformational approach connects the 
failure of a leisure activity in one country with the opportunity for criminals in that country and 
others. In order for crime risk management approaches in the meat supply chain to be effective, 
policy makers and managers in organizations must interface with and understand basic 
criminological concepts and adopt an interdisciplinary approach to mitigate crime in the food 
industry (Everstine et al. 2013). This requires a combined transactional and translational approach. 
4. Transactional and transformational approaches to contextualizing the food criminal 
and their actions 
 
Transactional food crime management focuses on the policies, procedures and protocols, often 
called pre-requisites that drive formal management of food crime and illegality and minimize risk. 
Conversely, transformational food crime management engages all those who work for an 
organization, irrespective of job title, to consider their continued role in keeping the food that is 
produced legal and compliant. In reality, an effective food crime management culture will 
encompass both transactional and transformational management, tools and activity. Transactional 
food crime management ensures organizational systems, products and services comply with 
legislative requirements, drives resource allocation based on cost: benefit analysis, and determines 
appropriateness through prescribed compliance audits and other verification activities. People 
employed to deliver ongoing compliance with such standards can be managed by others to be task 
focused i.e. driven transactionally by job descriptions, task checklists and routine requirements, 
but this approach lacks an understanding of how human behavior and mindset shapes the degree 
of compliance with such standards and indeed the potential for human behavior to be a root cause 
of system failure. Transformational food crime management is about inspiring staff to feel food 
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legality and compliance is important and to empower them to realize fully their specific role in 
ensuring compliance and that they are aware that there is always the potential for emerging or re-
emerging challenges that need to be effectively controlled, or if possible completely eliminated. 
       Schein’s model of culture considered the basic underlying assumptions of the culture those 
that are “invisible and unconscious”. Schein (1985) proposes that these assumptions are 
surrounded by the espoused values i.e. rules, standards and prohibitions. Such values by their 
nature are formal, transactional and define the values of the organization. Falkenberg and 
Herremans (1995) argue that within organizations it is difficult to separate the control of formal, 
and informal systems on behavior and furthermore that informal systems act to support and 
circumvent the formal systems that are in place. Each type of system, the formal and the informal 
(conscious and unconscious), has its own set of values and norms that may, or may not, be 
congruent. The challenge is when pressures within the informal system “encourage behaviors that 
are not aligned with the formally stated values and goals” (Falkenberg and Herremans 1995:134). 
It is important to consider that within an organization a range of sub-cultures may exist each with 
varying beliefs and values. In this context, Griffith (2014) described organizational culture as an 
umbrella term under which multiple cultures and multiple behaviors may exist. Although this 
work was in the area of food safety management it can be translated into considering food crime 
management. 
 
5. The behavioral approach to food crime 
 Currently, prediction of the potential for an incident of food adulteration and/or other types of 
food crime rests upon the appropriate analysis of intelligence through the use of predictive tools 
and expert knowledge (Manning and Soon 2014).  The information used to inform such risk 
assessment is often discrete, stored in a range of databases held by different regulators, private 
companies and other stakeholders or in knowledge repositories (including expert knowledge). 
Economic data that highlights market trends and supply chain vulnerabilities is usually completely 
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disconnected from data on food incident and consumer complaint databases.  This data is assessed 
often in the absence of a consideration of the motives and models of behavior of food criminals.  
Other business sectors such as the financial sector also have issues with identifying the potential 
for and mitigating fraud. This has led to a number of models being developed in this area.  Gbegi 
and Adebisi (2013) determine the primary factors that influence fraud as pressure, opportunity 
and rationalization – the so-called fraud triangle:  
 Pressure is differentiated into personal (individual e.g. financial or social pressure), 
employment (corporate pressure or management derived pressure) and external (business, 
stakeholder pressure to give a financial return, social and political environment and market 
(price) pressure);  
 Opportunity to commit fraud is influenced by the level, or conversely the absence, of 
formal control systems in the business network or specific business situation, previously 
described in this paper as countermeasures and/or the potential for weaknesses or gaps in 
the business network. Weak security, the depth of knowledge of the ability to defraud, the 
ability to conceal the fraudulent act once committed and the access to the means to defraud 
all influence the degree of opportunity; and 
 Rationalization being the ability of the individual to assess that their behavior is 
acceptable, even excusable to themselves and/or others.  
Gbegi and Adebisi (2013) argue that understanding the opportunity for undertaking fraud 
behavior in a given process allows forensic accountants to identify the types of fraud an individual 
can commit and this type of approach could be extended to food fraud and wider food crime 
analysis, thus reducing the potential for such opportunity to arise.  Further, Gbegi and Adebisi 
determine that the risk of fraud increases when the controls put in place do not operate as intended 
by management i.e. if management monitor the controls in place and their adequacy on a regular 
basis then this will reduce the likelihood of fraud.  This element translates too when considering 
the processes within the food supply chain where hot-spot analysis has been used historically to 
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determine weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the food supply chain and how controls can be put in 
place (pre-requisites) to prevent incidents occurring. One must also consider that the formal and 
informal culture and sub-cultures that operates within the food business is of value too in 
preventing or condoning illicit behavior. 
Wolf and Hermanson (2004) posited the fraud diamond model – breaking the three elements 
previously described into four and adding the dimensions of capability to opportunity, 
rationalization and incentive or pressure.  Gbegi and Adebisi (2013) also drafted their own 
diamond fraud model with the factors being capability, opportunity, motivation, and personal 
integrity.  These models inform the basis of the conceptual model developed in this study.  UK 
food industry insiders we interviewed identified two main basic types of crime/criminal in the 
food supply chain (Smith and Laing 2013): 
1. Parasitical type crime, generally committed as theft by organized crime groups who target 
livestock with the intention of passing the resultant meat, illegally into the food chain e.g. sheep 
rustling, poaching of wild animals or illegal harvesting of shellfish; or 
2. Insider type crime, where food business operators become involved in the misrepresentation, 
mislabeling or adulteration of product by adding cheaper and often potentially dangerous 
alternatives. In the case of meat (Operations Aberdeen and Fox) the alternative ingredient/material 
may have been condemned or previously classified as unfit for human consumption.  Moreover, 
traditional organized crime is undertaken by crime groups or Mafias and is usually known to 
police and the authorities.  The lone businessman is an individual with criminal inclinations and 
propensities whom is either targeted by organized crime groups or who align themselves to them.   
The category of criminal committing the fraud is an important consideration because each 
type of criminal has a different modus operandi. Canter (2000) argues that whilst the individual 
actions of an offender may not all be identical from one crime to the next the themes that 
characterize those crimes may often be reasonably consistent i.e. that offenders operate within a 
limited conceptual space that can be defined as has also suggested by Spink et al. (2013).  Canter 
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further differentiates between different types of offenders using the criteria of criminal versus 
non-criminal; class of crime i.e. whether the activity is against property or an individual; type of 
crime; the pattern of criminal action; the modus operandi and the criminal signature.  It should be 
noted that types of criminal are not mutually inclusive/exclusive and that to sell their stolen or 
appropriated goods, organized crime groups must form alliances with single, or multiple food 
business operators in the food crime network.  Criminal networks are characterized by diversity 
in composition, density of connections, size, structure, shape, underlying bonding mechanisms, 
degree of sophistication, and scope of activities (Williams 2001).  Further, Williams states that 
criminal networks feature a considerable division of labor among members and that a series of 
critical roles can be identified (Table 4) and argues that the capacity to cross national borders 
creates several advantages for criminal networks because it enables them to supply markets where 
the profit margins are largest, whilst operating from and in countries where risks are the least. 
Take in Table 4 
Table 4 sets out the roles adopted within criminal networks. In some networks, the tasks 
delegated to individuals will be implicit and intuitive; while in others, they are explicit and formal 
(Williams 2001).  A criminal eco-system develops around these practices and this brings routine 
activities theory into play (Felson 2006). This theory suggests that criminals are vulnerable in 
their everyday settings because they develop routines and common practices that make them 
predictable and thus interdictable. Adopting Felson’s approach of identifying events, sequences 
and settings is helpful in developing food crime risk assessment (FCRA) models.  Moreover, when 
dealing with such crime there is a tendency to be transactional i.e. to concentrate on the evidential 
and the criminal (and thus modus operandi) as opposed to the wider holistic picture of how the 
actors fit into the entrepreneurial crime business models and supply chain networks as described 
by Williams. 
In order to interdict the organized crime groups and criminal businesses involved in food 
crime (and criminal entrepreneurship in general) it is necessary to develop a sophisticated 
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understanding of how the criminals operate and how the businesses are organized.  The tested 
model of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) provides a useful tool that could be adapted to map the 
criminal business methods used by criminal organizations involved in the supply and exploitation 
of food particularly in relation to its nexus at the cross section of criminology and the economy.  
The ‘Business Canvass Model’ consists of nine basic building blocks: customer segments, value 
propositions, channels, customer relationships, revenue streams, key resources, key activities, key 
partnerships, and cost structure. These building blocks can be adapted and developed to 
incorporate other elements of business practice including the informal and the criminal.  Food 
crime involves a complex framework of organized crime groups and criminal businesses.  It may 
also include unwittingly involved law abiding organizations whilst criminal businesses may use 
the cover of legal business activity (Williams 2001).  Mapping the indicators, contexts, practices 
and outcomes identified onto the canvass helps in the modeling process (Scott et al. 2012).  In 
addition, building upon this business model approach, the theoretical model developed by Smith 
(2009) proves helpful in investigating and documenting different criminal and business practices 
and behavioural characteristics reported upon in previous studies.  From this process of review 
several different patterns based on modus operandi and modus vivendi emerge that could inform 
the development of the protean business models that assist with the development of an 
organizational typology of criminals.  These models can be used to explore the possibilities for 
interdicting and disrupting the criminal activities within as in this example, the meat supply, and 
also the wider food supply chain (Smith 2004; Wilkinson et al. 2010; Smith and McElwee 2013).  
Furthermore, Canter (2000) also considers the influence of the relationship between the 
offender/perpetrator and the victim.  If the victim is seen as an object only by the perpetrator then 
there will be few emotional elements to the food crime.  However the perpetrator may relate to 
the victims as a vehicle e.g. a crime directed at children through targeted food (milk powder, baby 
food) may be influenced by emotion e.g. ideology or anger at society as a whole.  Thus the crime 
is directed at a vulnerable group in that population or the crime could be personal against a known 
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group or individual or as a result of an event that occurred in the perpetrator’s own personal life.  
This approach also has value when translated to food crime.  PAS 96 (2014) highlights a series of 
criteria that can be used in the quantification of vulnerability to food crime and these have been 
drawn together with the other literature discussed in this paper within the construct of the “fraud 
diamond” (Table 5). 
Take in Table 5 
 
       Spink et al. (2013; 2014) consider the categorization of offender types in more detail in an 
effort to determine appropriate countermeasures and they argue that an offender can be identified 
either as a result of their profile (offender-based) or their activity (offense-based). In determining 
the potential for occurrence according to offender type some categories such as recreational or 
occasional criminal types may be of a low risk to the organization if appropriate countermeasures 
are implemented as opportunities to perpetrate the crime(s) can be minimized. The type of 
business, the ability to deliver an economic gain or the ease of committing food crime may mean 
that some products are not at risk of being vehicles for ideological, occupational or professional 
criminals.  However if an individual can operate unnoticed in an organization or operates in 
collaboration with the organization there is the opportunity for occupational crime especially 
where such activity is ignored or encouraged by management (Table 2). Spink et al. (2013) argue 
that the scale of opportunity is also a function of the level of organization of the criminals and 
therefore the degree of formalization of the criminal network or association plays a part too.  Spink 
et al. (2014) considered this factor in the development of their product-counterfeiting incident 
cluster tool.  In the research they categorize the types of offender organizations and this has been 
adapted in this study.  
Criminal networks are an important complement to traditional markets and supply chains 
(Williams 2001).  This makes them efficient, reduces transaction costs, and provides increased 
business opportunities for both buyers and sellers especially in a time of low cost trans-global 
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communication.  Networks have multiple characteristics and can vary in size, location (local or 
global), shape (cohesive or diffuse), membership, cohesion (goal-focused or disparate), and 
purpose (Williams 2001).  However, compartmentalization of information and knowledge as well 
as operational management gives greater assurance of survival of a part of the criminal network, 
and its business activities, in the event of whistle blowing, or infiltration by regulatory or law 
enforcement agencies.  Furthermore, Williams argues that governments, and in this context 
agencies such as the FSA and the European Food Standards Authority (EFSA), still operate along 
hierarchical lines and are further hindered by bureaucratic rivalry and competition, interagency 
antipathies, and a hesitance to share information, align databases and coordinate operations. This 
may be a manifestation of investigational carefulness. This naturally makes them less agile than 
the criminal networks they are seeking to address.  
Our conceptual framework (Figure 1) emerged from the synthesis of the interdisciplinary 
literature reviewed and considers the actors and drivers involved in food associated criminal 
activity and demonstrates that FCRA is only one element of a food crime management (FCM) 
program. 
Take in Figure 1  
 
Consideration needs to be given to a number of factors that are often industry specific and will 
vary from year to year especially as they influence the dynamics between supply and demand. A 
FCM program will contain transactional elements such as semi-quantitative risk assessment and 
priority setting. However because so much of the culture of food crime sits at the visible/invisible 
interface and the legitimate/illegitimate interface developing visible countermeasures is not 
enough. A transformational approach is required that might include criminal and victim profiling 
and analysis of behavioral factors as well. This holistic approach is essential to tackle the 
challenges that present themselves to the food industry and at policy level too. 
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6. Developing a conceptual framework for typing criminals and their activity in the 
meat supply chain 
The various literatures reviewed in this research have been synthesized in order to categorize the 
types of food supply chain offender organization, network, or sub element of a network and the 
types of criminal offense that may occur. Using the criteria in Table 2, ideological crime needs to 
be considered as a separate type of food crime because it is very context focused and the motive 
and rationalization for terrorist activities is different to wider food crime. The work of Spink et 
al. (2013); Spink et al. (2014) and Williams (2001) highlight particular elements of, or roles 
within, crime organizations and networks.  When this work is considered within the context of 
food crime it highlights the potential vulnerabilities for organizations seeking to mitigate food 
crime (Table 6) and potential supply chain countermeasures that could be of value. To this we add 
a further nuanced typological model based on the occupation and motivation of the food criminal 
with specific emphasis on the meat trade to create a more sophisticated tool (Table 7). 
Take in Tables 6 and Table 7 
 
 
The modus operandi and vivendi of the different groups are described. Although emphasis is 
placed on the meat trade the examples used translate to other commodity and high value food 
chains. The first category identified consists of ‘Industry Insiders’. These are a diverse group that 
includes rogue and criminal farmers; rogue entrepreneurs and small businessmen; rogue butchers 
and meat traders; and ‘Specialist Workers’ each of which have differing modus operandi and 
vivendi.  The second category identified consists of ‘Industry Outsiders’.   These include criminal 
mafias and cartels; organized crime groups; disorganized criminals and criminal labour. In order 
to undertake food crime risk assessment activities where the degree of food crime risk is actually 
determined on a case by case basis, organizations need to consider the type of criminal activity 
and also the likelihood for this activity to be associated with their materials and products.  Once 
the potential crimes have been identified the organization needs to consider the actual 
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countermeasures and controls that are currently in place and their efficacy, or that should be 
implemented whichever is appropriate to the situation in order to determine the actual magnitude 
of risk once mitigation has been undertaken. This approach is worthy of further study to consider 
how a countermeasures framework could be designed and effectively implemented. 
7. Discussion 
The synthesis of literature from seemingly disparate academic disciplines of food and agricultural 
policy, business theory and criminology and to characterize the modes of operation at work in 
such networks has allowed for the development of occupational and motivational typological tools 
that can be used in assessing the intricate nature of food crime in the meat trade. This approach 
can be applied to other sectors.    The European Horsemeat Scandal of 2013 highlighted the 
increasing organization and sophistication of the contemporary food criminal.  Our conceptual 
framework considers the actors and drivers involved in criminal activity using the meat supply 
chain as an example.  FCM procedures require not only that a formal risk assessment has been 
undertaken but also that countermeasures have been validated and are verified on a routine basis 
to ensure their continued appropriateness and effectiveness. This research has provided more 
sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the organizational ability of the food criminal, in 
terms of their modus operandi, and how individuals and groups develop criminal business models 
and networks in the meat supply chain. This research demonstrates the challenge of mitigating 
the activities of those individuals, criminal and commercial organizations exploiting the existing 
vulnerabilities at the interface between legitimate and illegitimate business activity.   
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Table 1. Types of food crime (Adapted from Spink and Moyer, 20131 and Croall 2009b2) 
Type1 Definition1 Definition2 
Adulteration A component of the finished product is fraudulent. Product adulteration. 
Counterfeit All aspects of the fraudulent product and packaging 
are fully replicated. 
 
Diversion The sale or distribution of legitimate products outside 
of intended markets. 
 
Over-run Legitimate product is made in excess of production 
agreements. 
 
Simulation Illegitimate product is designed to look like but does 
not exactly copy the legitimate product. 
 
Tampering Legitimate product and packaging are used in a 
fraudulent way. 
 




bioterrorism or  
sabotage 
Any of the above can lead to harm to the consumer 





 Use of words such as “natural”, 
“traditional”. Use of pictures e.g. 
depictions on packaging that do not reflect 
the nature of the product inside or the 
methods of production. 
Packaging size2  Use of overlarge packaging. 
 
Table 2. Criminal types and attributes (Adapted from Spink et al. 2013) 
Types of 
Criminals 
Definition Magnitude of risk 
(Likelihood/Severity) 
Ideological Domestic or international terrorist who 
commits the criminal act to make an 
ideological statement or to economically 
harm an entity, or to create panic and fear 
in the target population. 
Magnitude will depend on the nature of the product, 
organization, supply chain and/or the population targeted.  
Occasional Infrequent, opportunistic individual. Low risk potentially mitigated by implementing 
appropriate countermeasures. 
Occupational Crime occurs at the place of employment, 
either as an individual acting alone or in 
collaboration with the modus operandi of 
the organization. 
Magnitude of risk increases especially if individual can 
operate unnoticed in an organization or operates in 
collaboration with the organization. Potentially a degree of 
mitigation by implementing appropriate countermeasures 
unless the activity is deliberately ignored or encouraged by 
management. 
Professional Criminal activity fully finances their 
lifestyle. 
Magnitude of risk increases and will depend on the nature 
of the product, organization, supply chain and/or the 
population targeted. 
Recreational Undertakes crime for entertainment or 
amusement. 





Table 3. Crime types matrix according to criminal and type of offense (Adapted from Spink 
et al. 2014; Spink and Moyer 2011c; Croall 2009b) 
 
 Type of criminal 
Increasing in sophistication 
Ideological 
 











Adulteration   X X X 
Counterfeit    X X 
Diversion   X X X 
Over-run   X X X 
Simulation    X X 
Tampering  X X X X 
Theft  X X X X 
Malicious poisoning/ 
Bioterrorism/ sabotage 




   X  
X – identifies where this crime can occur 
Table 4. Roles in criminal networks (Adapted from Williams 2001) 
Role Description 
Organizers   Core individuals and groups that provide the steering mechanism for the network. These organizers 
generally determine the scale and scope of activities and guidance and provide the impetus for their 
execution. 
Insulators Individuals or groups whose role is essentially to insulate the core from the danger posed by infiltration 
and compromise. They transmit directives and guidance from the core to the periphery of the network 
ensuring that communication flows from the periphery do not compromise the individuals and groups in 
the core. 
Communicators Individuals who ensure that communication flows effectively from one actor to another across the 
network. They transmit directives from the core group and provide feedback. Some individuals may be 
insulators and communicators. 
Guardians Enforcers concerned with maintaining the security of the network, implementing measures to minimize 
vulnerability to external attack or infiltration and damage to the network.    
Extenders Extend the network by recruiting new members, by negotiating with other networks regarding 
collaboration, or encouraging defectors from the world of business, government, and law enforcement.   








Table 5: Criteria for determining risk of food crime (Adapted from Croall 2009b; EPRS 2014; Everstine et al. 2013; Gbegi and Adebisi 




to food and 
drink 





ill-health and even 
death.  
 
Sabotage of the 
supply chain 
leading to food 
shortage.  
 






Other food crime 
(as identified 
Table 3). 
Type of perpetrator e.g. people with no connection to 
the organization; those with a contractual relationship 




e.g. product has a particular religious, ethical or moral 
significance .  
 
Impact i.e. foods that are widely disseminated or 
distributed in the population will increase impact or the 
target is an ingredient that is used in a multiplicity of 
products e.g. Sudan I incident. 
 
Organizational profile i.e. 
profile of the organization, brands, or individuals within 
the organization make them more liable to threat; 
alienated or disaffected staff. 
 
Personal pressure/integrity e.g. financial gain or social 
pressure. 
 
Employment pressure e.g. corporate or management 
derived e.g. low staff morale or performance demands 
that are difficult to deliver using existing norms and 
behaviors. 
 
External or environmental pressure e.g. business, 
stakeholder demands, financial, social, political or 
market pressure. 
Low risk of detection. 
 
Lack of anti-food crime countermeasures. 
 
Limited consequences to individual e.g. lack 
of strong deterrent (legal or market). 
 
Acceptability of behavior i.e. personal or 
group acceptance of criminal or non-criminal 
behavior.  
 
Role in criminal network i.e. rationalization 
process will be different for different roles 
organizers, guardians, specialists etc. (Table 
5). 
 
Realization i.e. attacker wants to see an 
immediate and acute financial or health impact 
(terrorist group) or conversely the substitution 
has a chronic impact e.g. dioxin so it can go 
unnoticed for decades and/or the incidence 
may be so sporadic in the population that it is 
unlikely to be linked to a single source. 
Alternatively the perpetrator has no concern 
for the impact of the crime on individuals or 
organizations, or indeed there is no health 
impact. 
 
Financial gain overcoming considerations of 
personal integrity. 
 
Low risk of detection i.e. likelihood of routine 
QC/QA procedures to detect criminal activity.   
 
Lack of anti-food crime countermeasures 
e.g. lack of unique identity at product, lot and 
batch level; weak level of formalization of 
business, supply chain and national controls; 
physical, electronic and personnel security 
procedures. 
 
Vulnerability e.g. variability in border 
controls, gaps, hotspots or vulnerabilities in the 
supply chain, expanding global markets and 
pressures on services; multiple boundary 
interfaces in a complex supply chain; 
vulnerable points at which criminal activity 
might take place.  
 
Location: premises located in a politically or 
socially sensitive area; premises or services 
accessible to potential perpetrators; product 
contain ingredients or other material sourced 
from sensitive or insecure areas. 
 
Environment e.g. hazardous materials or 
potential agents are stored on the production 
site; inadequately sealed transport and limited 
tamper evident containment; challenges with 
zoonotic animal diseases in areas where there 

























Definition of enterprises  
 
Vulnerable roles within the network (see 
Table 4) 
 
Vulnerable activities and potential mitigation by food supply chain 
countermeasures 
Network Core Characterized by dense, often family or clan, connections between 
individuals acting as a directed network, providing the steering 
mechanism for the network.    
Limited vulnerability for organizers if 
insulators and guardians are effective. 




Individuals and organizations with weaker connections to the 
network core. The more extensive the periphery operations the 
more extensive and diverse the network can be socially, 
operationally in terms of their reach.  
The periphery provides the intelligence that suggests potential 
vulnerabilities and its interaction with the core driving 
entrepreneurial activity in terms of adaptability and reinvention of 
the organizational model. 
Communicators, extenders and specialists 
form vulnerable roles in the network. 
Communications between roles and legitimate and illegitimate 
organizations.  
Control levels of authority and communication channels within the 
legitimate organization/supply chain.  Limit knowledge of product, its 
characteristics, formulation and packaging to specific individuals internal 
and external. Monitor internal/external factors that increase 




An individual or organization that functions within a criminal 
network who cannot be easily replaced because they possess 
information, knowledge, skills and resources essential to the 
criminal network. Removal seriously affects the functioning of the 
network e.g. a laboratory making the substitute material that is 
being used in an incidence of food fraud.  
Specialists – individuals and organizations 
with food supply chain knowledge and 
technical ability to substitute, counterfeit 
etc. 
Laboratories, alternative manufacturers, 
packaging companies counterfeiting 
packaging, food technologists  
Build into the process manufacturing elements that cannot easily be 
replicated. Embed those facilities into secure elements of the site – 
keypad entry, designated personnel, etc. 
 
 
Secure product knowledge within the organization, introduce markers 





An association of individual criminals, criminal enterprises and 
groups formed for a specific purpose e.g. to substitute horsemeat 
for beef at a specific stage in the supply chain before relabeling and 
passing it on to unsuspecting individuals/organizations. Directed 
criminal networks can form wider translational criminal networks. 





Supplier assurance protocols. Develop countermeasures to identify the 
assurance measures necessary to mitigate. Develop supply chain 
partnerships e.g. increased integration and embedding of chain. 
Monitor changes in the economics of the supply chain with emphasis on 





An association of individual criminals, criminal enterprises and 
groups that form as a result of a desire to improve efficiency and 
reduce transactional costs. e.g. a network that comes together with 
the sole purpose of reducing cost in a supply chain and where 
“brokers” play a pivotal role at several stages in the supply chain. 




An association or strategic alliance between different criminal 
networks or between them and a terrorist organization for a 
common good. The pooling of resources aids the overall 
achievement of mutual and differentiated goals. 







Table 7: An occupation and motivational based typological model for categorizing food criminals with emphasis on the meat trade. 
 
Category 1 - Industry Insiders Description of modus operandi and vivendi 
Rogue and Criminal Farmers  Generally, Farmers are conservative and do not have a criminal mentality. They may possess a ‘Farmers mentality’ or pragmatic ‘hard headed’ 
approach to business and to making money. They abhor waste and actively pursue money making opportunities, or to break even financially.  This 
is a mix of ideological, professional and occupational nouse (Spink and Moyer 2011c). A small number of farmers can be classified as rogue farmers 
(Smith 2004; Smith and McElwee 2013) and will knowingly conspire to pass otherwise wasted food products into the extended food supply chain. 
They may actively conspire with others to steal animals for profit or fraudulently report animals stolen. Alternatively, they may launder stolen animals 
into their flock or through their farm shop; fraudulently label food as being from another source. They may deal direct to rogue butchers and 
restaurateurs or to trusted members customers. Rogue farmers take advantage of opportunity, whereas the criminal farmer repeatedly engages in such 
acts. They are difficult to interdict because they operate from the privacy of their own farms and normally do not come to the attention of the 
authorities. The farmer possesses specialist insider knowledge of farming and of the food industry.  
Rogue Entrepreneurs and Small 
Businessmen 
This smaller more discrete category, consists of entrepreneurs and small-businessmen actively engaged in the food trade or associated occupation.  It 
may consist of rural shopkeepers and traders who deal directly with farmers and restaurateurs. They may own a store apparently unconnected to 
farming or the food industry but may sell food fraudulently. They may be hauliers or plant-hire specialists who earn additional income by transporting 
stolen animals or hiring plant to the criminals.   
Rogue Butchers and Meat Traders These bear the least risk of all food criminals because unless caught in the act of exchanging / purchasing they can launder the stolen / fraudulent 
meat directly into their businesses.  
Specialist Workers Are ex-farm workers or labourers with knowledge of farming practices and insider knowledge of how to deal with animals and farm-machinery. 
Likewise, many rural or urban worker have experience of farm work. They extract ‘cash-in-hand’ payments.  
Category 2 - Industry Outsiders Description of modus operandi and vivendi 
Criminal Mafias and Cartels  These have little or no direct association with the business or trade being investigated. They will be organizers and financiers. They may be ’sleeping 
partners’ in the business or may have infiltrated it via threats or blackmail. The category contains businessmen with no criminal records who have to 
be treated sensitively by the authorities making it an extremely difficult category to investigate.  
Organized Crime Groups Consists of organized criminals who are not traditional ‘organized crime groups’ but who seek the lucrative profits. They may not initially possess 
the necessary knowledge of farming or the food trade and tend to be more opportune and easier to investigate because they are known to the police. 
Disorganized Criminals This opportunist group are easier to interdict because they are predatory and have no contacts with the trade.   







Figure 1: Food crime organizational typology framework 
